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ABSTRACT: This article analyses past trade trends and agricultural protectionism in Latin American
agriculture, by examining observed changes in Latin American agriculture and trade policies over the last
20 years that have led to what the authors call the«New Open Regionalism». It also discussed the conflic-
ting interests and various trading positions taken up by Latin American countries in multilateral trade
talks, as a result of the strong heterogeneity between net agricultural exporters and importers. The authors
show that the repeated failure of the Doha round of trade talks opens the door for bilateral or sub-regional
free trade agreements, concluding with the prediction that regional integration in Latin America will
come about as a result of agreements between various sub-regional trade blocs. The weakness of internal
demand makes the development of the region’s agri-food sector highly dependent on exports, the growth
of which is one of the main economic drivers in these countries, particularly net exporters. In addressing
the issue of the distribution of profits from trade liberalization, the authors propose a variety of schemes
that have already proved their effectiveness in countries such as Mexico, Turkey, Brazil, Colombia, Nica-
ragua and Honduras.
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Nuevos acuerdos regionales de comercio en Latinoamérica y disposición 
a negociar: el caso de la agricultura
RESUMEN: Este artículo analiza las tendencias del comercio agrario y el proteccionismo de la agricul-
tura en Latinoamérica, examinando los cambios observados en la agricultura y la política comercial en
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02 Valdes  12/6/07  10:08  Página 15los últimos 20 años, denominados por los autores como«nuevos acuerdos regionales de comercio». Tam-
bién se discuten el conflicto de intereses y las variadas posiciones comerciales desarrolladas por los dis-
tintos países de América Latina, como resultado de una fuerte heterogeneidad entre los exportadores y los
importadores agrarios netos. Los autores muestran que los reiterados fallos de las negociaciones comer-
ciales de la ronda Doha abrieron las puertas para acuerdos comerciales libres bilaterales o sub-regionales,
concluyendo con la predicción de que la integración regional traerá como resultado un acuerdo entre va-
rios bloques de comercio sub-regionales. La debilidad de la demanda interna hace que el desarrollo del
sector agroalimentario dependa fuertemente de las exportaciones, especialmente de los exportadores ne-
tos. En la dirección de los resultados de la distribución de beneficios de los acuerdos de liberalización, los
autores proponen una variedad de esquemas que han tenido su efectividad en países como México, Tur-
quía, Brasil, Colombia, Nicaragua y Honduras.  




During the period of structural reforms in many Latin American countries in the
late 1980s and early 1990s a new regional approach to trade and economic integra-
tion began to take shape. Although at first the evolution of this«new regionalism»
was an unplanned consequence of the unilateral decisions by various governments,
it«emerged as an integral component of the structural reform process… complemen-
ting and reinforcing the modernization policies… and adopted as part of the region’s
participation in the multilateral liberalization emerging from the Uruguay Round»1.
Given a common cultural identity and language, and the advantage of lower transport
costs due to proximity, the two essential elements of the process of individual country
policy reforms that promoted greater regional integration were a turn toward liberali-
zed domestic markets and apertura –the opening first to trade and then capital flows.
Both encouraged investment, from domestic and international sources, and an incre-
ase in trade –and so created an environment in which policy makers recognized the
importance of the design of the rules of regional commerce. Advancing regional inte-
gration in turn supported continued liberalization of domestic markets and further
openness to trade.
The new approach to enhancing regional integration was part of a broad shift in
structural policy toward more-open-market economies, in marked contrast to the
prior efforts at integration burdened by the strategy of import substitution based on
high levels of protection (except for limited preferential market access). There had
been a previous effort at regional integration in the 1960s and 1970s, but the results
were disappointing, integration having progressed very little by way of maintaining
reduced border protection and cross-border capital flows. Trade was limited in an en-
vironment of import substitution, enforced through high tariffs, quantitative restric-
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the main trade instrument, quantitative restrictions and state trading served to limit
imports. In addition, in part to fight inflation, there were export controls (licenses, ta-
xes, quotas) and internal price controls.
Unilateral liberalization of domestic and border policies during the late 1980s and
early 1990s sparked a chain reaction: increased trade and investment demonstrated
the development potential of foreign capital, export diversification and taking advan-
tage of foreign markets for scale economies. But these benefits required the coordina-
tion –through bilateral or multilateral agreements– of internal market, trade and in-
vestment policies. The goal of trade agreements was to guarantee credible,
longer-term institutions that would both guard against future protectionist tendencies
and allow the resolution of disputes arising in domestic markets and at the border.
The type of Latin American regionalism that has resulted is part of broad range of in-
ternational agreements, multilateral and bilateral, reaching across and beyond the re-
gion itself, termed«open regionalism».
Regional integration can range in depth from the straightforward free trade in
goods, to the free flow of both goods and services, to customs unions, to common
markets, to monetary unions. At present liberalized tariff regimes and tariff prefe-
rence have substantially enhanced the flow of goods within Latin America, and,
while lagging, there is continued progress with respect to services and labor. Bila-
teral and multilateral agreements have promoted the flow of goods and services
–through a«spaghetti bowl» of confusing and roundabout links– between Central
America, NAFTA, the Andean Group, MERCOSUR, and many pairs of trading
partners, and stretching out to OECD, Pacific Rim and European economies. MER-
COSUR is an imperfectly functioning customs union, which beyond common ta-
riffs for members extends to tariff preferences to associates and trade agreements
with countries outside of the region. Trade in goods has been facilitated by the de-
velopments in foreign investment in domestic infrastructure and services, and re-
gional cooperation related to infrastructure –transport, energy, and telecommunica-
tions. 
Another positive result of the gains in regional market and policy integration
via unilateral and bilateral agreements and has been a loose form of Latin Ameri-
can geopolitical coherence that presents both a more credible commitment to a re-
gional market attractive to investors, and a shared economic and political stance in
international negotiations. The recent evolution of Latin America’s new regiona-
lism, although complementary to unilateral integration in world market and ser-
ving as a laboratory for advances in multilateral negotiations, is not considered a
substitute for improvements in the multilateral system. This is particularly the
case with respect to agriculture, a major contributor to exports from Latin America
to the rest of the world. There is great interest in seeking access for agricultural
products –raw and processed– to OECD countries and developing countries in ot-
her regions. And successful WTO negotiations are perceived as a way of pushing
individual countries to continue reforms in domestic agricultural policy that have
proven resistant to negotiate at the bilateral and regional level. The WTO is where
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ling duties), and where there is a credible system dispute resolution, a topic left
out of Latin American regional agreements. 
Why might agricultural trade expansion, spurred by successful WTO negotia-
tions, be of importance for Latin America? One reason is that basic and processed
agricultural trade can stimulate economic growth and create employment opportu-
nities, with a resulting increase in the incomes of workers and the poor, especially
in rural areas. This, after all, was the initial theme of the Doha Round. Indeed, La-
tin America has been a leader in trade liberalization in comparison to other regions,
several individual countries unilaterally beginning reforms and liberalization du-
ring the 1980s and 1990s and predating the Uruguay Round Agreement. Moreover
countries in the region have also been active in trade negotiations under past and
current rounds of WTO negotiations. For example, there is the G20 led by Brazil,
and the participation of Brazil, Chile and Argentina in other groups, such as the
Cairns group.
In this paper we address three general issues with respect to agricultural trade
concerns in Latin America in the light of the new regionalism and in context of
on-going WTO negotiations. First, what are the general trade policy questions cu-
rrently under debate in the region? Second, what are some of conflicts of interest
with respect to trade between countries and within countries, and how have these
conflicts have been impacted by national policy reforms, intra-regional agree-
ments, and agreements with countries outside the region? Finally, what can be said
about the region’s positions with respect to the formulation of rules within on-
going WTO negotiations in light of current outstanding trade policy questions and
conflicts of interest?
With respect to the trade policy questions and conflicts of interest, the second
section reviews the importance and structure of agricultural trade to the economies
in the region. The wide diversity of trading patterns across countries in the region
has implications with regards to negotiating positions. The third section turns to
how recent developments in LAC countries’ domestic and trade policies have res-
ponded to these questions and conflicts. The fourth section addresses likely trends
in (a) negotiating positions, (b) the emphasis on agro-food standards in developing
country markets, and (c) in the development of domestic compensation and sa-
fety/net schemes. The fifth section discusses a source of political divergence, limi-
ting the incentive to form a common WTO negotiating position for the region: the
significance of the diversity of agricultural production and exports in setting priori-
ties for trade negotiations. Finally, drawing on lessons from past trade reforms and
current trends relevant to the Latin American agricultural sector and trade, we con-
clude with some reflections on what might be priorities for domestic policies and
trade negotiations that could aid in the transition to freer trade and continue toward
greater regional integration.
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Caribbean
This section discusses the significance of agriculture to trade in the region. One
question to address is the contribution to total national exports and imports of crop,
livestock, and forestry products. Another issue is the distinction between the net ove-
rall agricultural trade position and the net food trade position, the latter being impor-
tant for understanding domestic agricultural policy debates, especially with regard to
the question of national food security and food import dependence. Agricultural trade
should be examined not only with respect to primary agriculture –the size of which is
reflected in sectoral GDPs– but also with respect to the agro-processing sector (not
included in agricultural GDP). The agro-processing industry has grown significantly
in terms of exports from the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region and largely
depends on the performance of primary agriculture. Afocus on processed agricultural
exports is motivated by the growing importance of non-farm employment and in-
come in rural areas. And because much of agro-processing is not accounted for in
agricultural GDP, the downstream links of the primary agricultural sector to the na-
tional economy should not be overlooked. This is especially important in a region
that is relatively land abundant and where the growth of agriculture is constrained by
domestic demand, leaving export markets as an avenue both for sectoral growth and,
more generally, for growth in the rural economy. 
A. Agro-forestry exports and imports
Table 1 reports the shares in total exports and imports of agricultural goods for 22
countries in the region. Agricultural exports represent more than 25% of total export
revenue for nine countries, reaching as high as 40% for Argentina, Cuba, Guatemala,
Honduras, Paraguay and Uruguay. Countries for which the share is relatively small
are the oil-exporting countries of Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela, and
the Caribbean. On the import side, the shares of agricultural and forestry products are
generally smaller, ranging between 8 to 20%. The only country with a share greater
than 20% is Haiti (34%). Twelve of the twenty-two countries are net exporters of
agro-forestry products, the net importers being the oil exporters, Mexico, Trinidad
and Tobago, and Venezuela; the Caribbean countries; and El Salvador, Peru, Panama.
In volume and total value, the region as a whole is clearly a net exporter of agricultu-
ral and forestry products, but in terms of number of countries, the region is almost
evenly divided between net exporters and importers. 
Crop and livestock products clearly predominate. In terms of totals for crop, lives-
tock and forestry, export products deriving from crops and livestock average more
than 75% of total agro-forestry exports. Chile is notable for the size of share of ex-
ports due to forestry products (35%). The share of crop and livestock products avera-
ges around 80% for agro-forestry imports for the three sub regions. Unlike exports,
forestry’s share of imports is high for many countries. The highest shares for forestry
imports are found in Argentina (40%), Costa Rica (33%), Ecuador (20%), the Domi-
nican Republic (23%), and Trinidad and Tobago (22%). 
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Exports Imports Balance
Ag/TOT (%) Ag/TOT (%) EXAg/IMAg
South America
Argentina 40.4 7.8 7.73 NEX
Bolivia 31.9 14.7 1.57 NEX
Brazil 31.0 7.9 4.08 NEX
Chile 26.1 7.8 3.51 NEX
Colombia 23.1 14.9 1.56 NEX
Ecuador 32.2 10.8 2.79 NEX
Paraguay 45.2 12.5 1.59 NEX
Peru 10.9 16.2 0.66 NIM
Uruguay 50.2 16.0 2.31 NEX
Venezuela 1.3 14.2 0.18 NIM
Central America and Mexico
Costa Rica 30.6 11.4 2.21 NEX
Guatemala 56.2 16.8 1.50 NEX
Honduras 47.9 18.2 1.21 NEX
Mexico 9.4 11.7 0.62 NIM
Nicaragua 45.7 15.4 1.34 NEX
Panama 35.1 14.9 0.66 NIM
El Salvador 17.9 18.5 0.56 NIM
Caribbean
Cuba 47.9 17.9 0.90 NIM
Dominican Republic 10.1 13.7 0.66 NIM
Haiti 7.6 33.7 0.06 NIM
Jamaica 17.1 13.3 0.52 NIM
Trinidad & Tobago 5.8 12.0 0.57 NIM
Source: Authors’calculations from FAOSTAT. 
Note: NEX represents a net exporting country, NIM a net importing country.
B. Net trade positions in food and agricultural products
Table 2 presents trade in agricultural products, distinguishing between the net
overall agricultural trade position and the net food trade position. The broad agricul-
tural group covers the products discussed above in reference to Table 1. The food
group includes cereals, dairy products, eggs, vegetable oils, meats, and sugar. The
concept of food here is broader than that used by some international agencies, such as
FAO, which often excludes sugar and vegetable oils, based on a definition of«essen-
tial foods.» One notable result of Table 2 is that only five of the 22 countries conside-
red are net exporters of food, and all are in MERCOSUR or are associated members2. 
TABLE 1
Export and import shares and trade balance for agriculture and forestry in LAC, 
1999-2001 averages
2 Two countries, Bolivia and Guatemala are borderline cases of net food importation. Bolivia particu-
larly in the Santa Cruz area produces soybeans, rice and other grains. 
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nent, 16 of the 22 countries are net food importers, nine of which are also net impor-
ters of all agricultural products. But in contrast to food products only, for all agricul-
tural products there are ten net importers and twelve net agricultural exporters
compared to five net food exporters. Notably, there are seven countries that are both
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TABLE 2
Net trade position in food and agricultural products (excluding forestry and fisheries), 
averages 2000-2002, in millions of U.S. dollars
+ Data for exports and imports are in millions of US dollars deflated by the World Bank’s manufactures index
(1990=100). 
++ Fisheries are for 2000-2001. Agricultural exports (crops and animals) here comprise all primary and processed products. 
Source: authors’calculations from FAOSTAT.
South America
Argentina 5,437.4 224.7 5,212.7 24.2 10,900.0 872.9 10,027.1 12.5
Bolivia 124.8 113.4 11.3 1.1 403.3 232.0 171.3 1.7
Brazil 5,769.0 2,076.9 3,692.1 2.8 16,000.0 3,768.2 12,231.8 4.2
Chile 359.0 577.3 –218.3 0.6 3,351.4 1,228.4 2,123.0 2.7
Colombia 388.8 724.8 –336.0 0.5 2,925.6 1,577.5 1,348.1 1.9
Ecuador 71.9 189.8 –117.9 0.4 1,592.1 475.2 1,116.9 3.4
Paraguay 131.5 58.7 72.9 2.2 519.3 310.1 209.3 1.7
Peru 54.5 616.1 –561.5 0.1 739.4 1,052.8 –313.3 0.7
Uruguay 733.5 112.2 621.2 6.5 998.0 387.3 610.6 2.6
Venezuela 64.1 858.0 –793.9 0.1 329.6 1,813.5 –1,483.9 0.2
Total South America 13,300.0 5,643.2 7,656.8 2.4 38,000.0 11,900.0 26,100.0 3.2
Central America and Mexico
Costa Rica 178.8 205.4 –26.6 0.9 1,698.2 518.5 1,179.6 3.3
El Salvador 136.9 374.2 –237.3 0.4 539.3 822.0 –282.7 0.7
Guatemala 346.2 384.5 –38.3 0.9 1,434.7 793.0 641.7 1.8
Honduras 51.4 216.6 –165.3 0.2 630.8 491.1 139.7 1.3
Mexico 811.0 5,385.2 –4,574.2 0.2 8,191.1 11,200.0 –3,008.9 0.7
Nicaragua 152.0 146.9 5.1 1.0 404.4 294.2 110.2 1.4
Panama 51.5 180.8 –129.4 0.3 313.0 417.3 –104.3 0.8
Total Central America 
and Mexico
1,763.1 6,922.8 –5,159.6 0.3 13,300.0 14,700.0 –1,400.0 0.9
Caribbean
Cuba 504.1 598.7 –94.5 0.8 812.8 848.2 –35.3 1.0
Dominican Republic 97.3 325.0 –227.7 0.3 595.0 691.9 –96.9 0.9
Haiti 0.0 259.3 –259.3 0.0 23.2 362.0 –338.8 0.1
Jamaica 96.1 283.3 –187.1 0.3 260.2 404.8 –144.6 0.6
Trinidad and Tobago 82.6 163.5 –80.9 0.5 248.8 344.5 –95.7 0.7
Total Caribbean 847.0 2,125.6 –1,278.6 0.4 2,310.2 3,746.4 –1,436.2 0.6
Latin America and
Caribbean
15,900.0 14,700.0 1,200.0 1.1 53,600.0 30,300.0 23,300.0 1.8
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Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
These results are relevant for agricultural trade negotiations. The common percep-
tion is that there exists a high cost of agricultural protection in OECD countries for
Latin America, based on the presumption that most countries in the region are net ex-
porters. Only five countries are net food exporters, and they are losers with current
OECD protectionism –and subsidy-induced lower world prices. The increase in
world prices due to a reduction in the protection and subsidies in the OECD would be
beneficial for nonfood agricultural exports, affecting many more countries (12).
While it is clear why most LAC countries –seeking to expand their exports– would
be enthusiastic for trade liberalization and subsidy reduction in the OECD, the case
of net-food and net-agriculture importers is ambiguous. It is, however, important to
note that there is hypothetical possibility that today’s net food import position in
some products could decline due to trade reversals arising from higher world prices
that would result from trade liberalization in the OECD.
Industrial country trade liberalization would increase world prices, and thus would
increase the food import bill and have a negative effect on terms of trade. It is also often
claimed that multilateral liberalization would raise the domestic prices of food. But con-
sidering that OECD trade liberalization would require at least some degree of reciprocal
liberalization in developing countries, reduced tariffs and greater market access in LAC
countries would have a mitigating effect on domestic prices. The final result on domestic
prices would be uncertain, and depend on the magnitude of world price changes relative
to the degree of reduced border protection in LAC countries. This helps to anticipate
where OECD reforms would have significant impacts, and where they would not. It is
difficult to discuss price effects in the aggregate, but for a particular country and a parti-
cular product, one could simulate a potential price and find to what degree a country
might have flexibility via its own tariffs to mitigate price increases on sensitive products. 
What are the lessons from the importance of agricultural trade in the region? First,
the primary sector contributes significantly to overall national trade: more than a
third of export revenues in recent years are in agro-forestry exports, although this
share has been declining. There is considerable interest in obtaining market access in
world markets to expand these agro-forestry exports. But the share of agro-forestry
export trade to total trade is quite heterogeneous across LAC countries. Second, this
high degree of heterogeneity carries over to countries’net trade positions in both food
and all agro-forestry products. In terms of the number of countries, there is a high de-
gree of food import dependence, relevant for future WTO negotiations.
3. Toward an«Open New Regionalism»: Trade policy
developments in Latin America
A. Past unilateral domestic and trade policy reforms
Prior to the Uruguay Round, most Latin American countries implemented eco-
nomy-wide policy reforms, including trade liberalization, deregulation, privatization
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with macroeconomic stabilization. Trade reforms implemented during the late 1980s
and early 1990s were initially unilateral, and subsequently incorporated into bilateral
and sub-regional agreements (MERCOSUR, NAFTA, the Andean Group, and
CAFTA). These reforms were also entirely consistent with the later adoption of the
results of the Uruguay Round, leaving LAC with few mandated policy changes. The
unilateral approach was also consistent with what we know today from global simu-
lation modeling about the expected gains of agricultural trade liberalization: the prin-
cipal beneficiaries of trade reforms are the trade liberalizers themselves.
One of the primary goals of trade reforms during the 1980s and 1990s was to re-
verse the strong bias that had existed previously in favor of manufacturing and urban
sectors and against export agriculture. With reforms, domestic terms of trade between
agriculture and the rest of the economy were expected to change to the benefit of the
farm sector, especially in the case of exportable goods. But in several cases, prior ex-
pectations with regard to relative prices at the farm level were not realized, due most
notably to currency appreciations and to a fall in border prices. By focusing only on
sectoral trade policy reforms, it was natural to conclude that agricultural producers
should have experienced a significant increase in relative prices. But, the data show
that real domestic prices of farm tradables fell after the initiation of reforms in seve-
ral countries, primarily as result of a currency appreciation (reinforced by occasional
declines in world prices). In terms of prices, the main forces behind the changes in
agricultural incentives were beyond the control of sectoral policies: exchange rates,
border prices and real interest rates (Valdés, 1996). Although the real price of trada-
bles in several cases had episodes of decline, the relative price of exportables to im-
portables and to home goods increased. 
Given the above, there was a notably rapid overall expansion in agriculture-rela-
ted exports in the 1990s, during the time of unilateral economic reforms, as shown in
Table 3. The expansion of exports of primary agricultural averaged around 5% per
annum, but with a wide range from a high positive growth (Peru 10%, Brazil 9%,
Mexico and Chile 7.5%) to a high negative growth (Bolivia, Colombia, the Carib-
bean in general, and Venezuela). Notable also are the growth rates in the exports of
processed products, which are higher in most countries than the growth rates for pri-
mary products. This is especially true for Central America, Bolivia, Chile, and Me-
xico. The growth in forestry products is high in some countries, although one should
remember that, beyond a few countries, the reference base is small. As an overall
conclusion, in the LAC region generally the export agro-forestry sector has been dy-
namic over the past decade.
The growth in agro-processed products points to the importance of confronting the
tariff escalation issue, both in FTAs with the US and in WTO negotiations. At least in
terms of bilateralism with the US, reductions in tariffs on processed and storage able
commodities were left behind, with an eight to twelve year period before tariff reduc-
tions. Moreover, such products remain vulnerable to the application by the US of spe-
cial safeguards. This was clearly the case of the US-Chile agreement, used as a tem-
plate for CAFTA. What is remarkable from looking at Tables 3 and 4, there has been a
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ped countries. This suggests that exports of this sector could expand even faster. 
As a general rule for the LAC region, export agriculture did expand in spite of the
unexpected and unfavorable changes in domestic terms of trade. Moreover, exports
expanded faster for countries that had early and sustained reforms. The bias against
export agriculture did indeed decline: not only were export taxes eliminated and pro-
tection to importables reduced, but also trade reforms were accompanied by other po-
licy changes, such as deregulation and privatization, which reduced significantly the
transactions costs of agricultural and agro-processing activities. That is, the opening
of trade was a leading element of economic policy reorientation, but it was only part
of the story. Trade reforms were made in the context of economy-wide structural re-
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TABLE 3
Annual (compounded) rate of change in exports 1990/1992 to 2000/2002, primary and processed













Argentina 4.10 6.58 7.12 8.49 5.59
Brazil 8.92 4.72 6.06 6.80 6.59
Bolivia -6.14 17.05 –5.16 –21.62 8.21
Chile 7.45 12.05 7.36 7.32 8.07
Colombia -1.98 9.52 15.03 3.86 2.25
Costa Rica 4.40 13.09 6.65 10.30 6.77
Cuba –11.41 –12.07 -18.55 –2.62 –11.46
Dominican Republic 1.50 7.60 4.72 9.98 5.49
Ecuador 3.92 13.97 9.03 2.16 4.75
Guatemala 5.47 7.66 3.69 3.83 6.13
Haiti -1.37 -1.08 22.66 8.97 -0.37
Honduras -0.01 13.21 8.35 5.98 1.86
Jamaica 0.65 1.45 -39.12 4.15 1.20
Mexico 7.39 16.25 3.02 8.30 10.17
Nicaragua 5.25 12.19 22.03 20.17 8.65
Panama –0.09 3.64 9.27 13.74 4.20
Paraguay –2.96 3.97 1.85 5.42 –1.66
Peru 10.27 9.26 33.38 11.05 10.30
El Salvador 0.39 15.97 11.73 6.66 6.12
Trinidad and Tabago 5.47 8.67 5.59 15.86 8.64
Uruguay 2.59 5.04 16.42 1.95 4.20
Venezuela -6.33 5.33 9.25 6.76 3.43
South America 5.09 6.47 6.90 7.05 5.95
Central America 5.31 13.94 4.65 9.65 8.12
Caribbean –5.29 -5.93 3.45 1.11 –5.37
LAC Region 4.88 5.80 6.73 7.25 5.56
Source: Authors’ estimates based on FAOSTAT. Annual rates of change based on averages for the years from 1990 to
1992 and from 2000 to 2002. Fisheries based on 2000 to 2001. Nominal values in dollars deflated by the Manufacturers
Unit Value index of the World Bank. Primary and processed agricultural products based on FAO definitions.
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of ports, the privatization of telecommunications, airline and shipping deregulation,
cheaper equipment, machinery, and raw materials due to tariff reductions, greater fle-
xibility in the foreign exchange regime and financial sector, and other changes, were
influential in determining response of agriculture.
One should recognize the difficulty of isolating the partial effects of trade liberali-
zation from the myriad impacts that resulted from general economic reforms. Nevert-
heless, it is possible to discern a pattern from recent analyses. First, in most cases
trade reforms did have a positive impact on agriculture, particularly exportables. Wit-
hout trade reforms, other reforms probably would have had a limited impact on the
sector. That is, the sequencing of reforms, and especially trade liberalization early on
and the removal of distorted domestic prices, was very important, although many
tend to ignore the importance of initial and credible changes in incentives. Second,
the breadth of the reform program matters: there are complementarities between trade
reforms and other economic policy changes. The positive impacts of trade liberaliza-
tion on the performance of the agricultural sector –in terms of changes in product
mix, investments, resource mobility and greater flexibility to adjust to changing con-
ditions– were enhanced by improving infrastructure, deregulation and privatization,
and more generally reorienting the economy toward markets.
There has been over the last several years little consensus across the region with
respect to the social impact of the reforms. This is in part due to the difficulty in iso-
lating the effects of reforms from mismanagement and exogenous shocks. In any
event, the emphasis of the policy debate over structural and sectoral reforms has shif-
ted: from the productive and export potential of agriculture, to the difficulties posed
by a liberalized economy for import-competing farmers; and from the impact on far-
mers and urban consumers (who are now nearly forgotten), to the rural poor and the
small farm sector presumed excluded from the benefits of more open trade. 
Did the benefits of reforms not reach some sectors? Yes, part of the small farm
sector was excluded. This subset includes those who farm in relatively low-producti-
vity areas, but also, more generally, part of the small farm sector faces difficulties in
adjusting to several changes in the economic environment: an open trade regime
(higher price risk), the increasing demands of buyers for higher volumes and stan-
dards (associated with the increasing concentration of agribusiness and the develop-
ment of supermarkets), the general trend toward greater capital intensity, and the ove-
rall reduction in subsidies to agriculture. But with respect to rural poverty, we
conclude that, overall, reforms did not contribute to poverty, and in some cases con-
tributed to the reduction of poverty3.
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3 Arecent book on lessons from NAFTAby Lederman, Maloney and Serven (2005) discusses the im-
pacts on labor employment and poverty in rural Mexico. The authors show that subsistence farmers were
substantially less affected by NAFTA than many analysts had expected. Based on E. Taylor’s work
(2001), they conclude that rural campesino communities are much more diversified than what was once
thought and farmers face high transmission costs getting their crops to markets, implying local rather than
international price determination. The relative isolation from international competition also kept those
farmers among the poorest Mexicans and prevented them from taking advantage new opportunities offe-
red by NAFTTA(pp. 224-225).
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Tropical
Coffee
Raw 7.3 0.1 6.0
Final 12.1 10.1 18.8
Cocoa
Raw 0.5 0.0 0.0
Intermediate 9.7 0.2 7.0





Raw 9.2 4.6 8.7
Intermediate 13.3 5.5 13.2
Final 22.5 10.2 16.7
Vegetables
Raw 9.9 4.6 8.7
Intermediate 13.3 5.5 13.2
Final 22.5 10.2 16.7
Seafood
Raw 11.5 0.6 4.9
Intermediate 5.1 3.2 4.3
Final 16.2 3.5 9.1
Economic reforms toward open trade do not guarantee benefits for all agricultural
sub sectors. The objective of such reforms should be to improve the use of resources
generally, to permit all economic agents –and the agriculture sector specifically– to
discover their comparative advantages. With the experience of the LAC region, one
can draw a few lessons. First, that no country’s farm sector as a whole was worse off
as a result of the reforms. Second, for the countries that stayed on course with a cohe-
rent policy strategy, agriculture showed significant positive outcomes, primarily in
the export-oriented sector. Third, a subset of farmers suffered as producers in import-
competing activities, although not as consumers. Fourth, if there is fiscal flexibility, a
government might well look both at targeted compensation schemes, and at exit stra-
tegies for uncompetitive sectors.
Beyond world commodity market trends, there have been recent policy develop-
ments that present special opportunities and challenges to the region’s agricultural
sector. The most directly important (although perhaps not the most long-term signifi-
cant) development has been the several bilateral and sub regional trade agreements.
Following the earlier NAFTA, MERCOSUR, the Andean Group, and the Central
American and Caribbean agreements, the most notable new initiatives have been
with U.S. participation: ratified agreements with CAFTA (including the Dominican
Republic) and Chile. Chile already have agreements signed with China, the EU, Me-
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TABLE 4
Tariff escalation: average MFN applied out-of-quota duties (%)
Source: Aksoy and Beghin (2004), based on WTO IDB data.
02 Valdes  11/6/07  08:52  Página 26xico, Canada, South Korea, Singapore, New Zealand, and Japan. Mexico has agree-
ments with the EU and Japan. Some countries are negotiating with China and India,
and MERCOSUR is negotiating with the EU –although at a snail’s pace. Brazil (and
to some extent Argentina) presents a special case: too large a potential source of agri-
cultural exports to be easily accommodated by EU countries. But for the rest of Latin
America, these concluded and future agreements are part of the«open new regiona-
lism» and will increase pressures on the competitiveness of national agricultural sec-
tors and induce adjustments.  
This trend toward regional integration has been an ongoing interest of the United
States particularly. For example, the Caribbean Basin Initiative was configured to fa-
cilitate trade between the US and 24 countries in the Caribbean and Central America.
It started in 1983 as the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) and it
was renewed in year 2000 under the denomination of Caribbean Basin Trade Part-
nership Act (CBTPA), which, will expire in September 2008. The agreement provi-
des free duty treatment for member countries and quota free benefits in some cases.
The beneficiaries are Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bri-
tish Virgin Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gre-
nada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Anti-
lles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. Recently, the United States administration has
also signed agreements with Colombia and Peru in December of 2005, to promote a
comprehensive opening. These last two are awaiting ratification by the US Congress,
and talks with Ecuador have been suspended.
In 1991, the US Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) was enacted to promote the
eradication of drug production and trafficking in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Boli-
via. It expired on December 2001 but ATPA was renewed in 2002 under the name of
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) which, will expire on
December 31, 2006.  The preference benefits around 5,600 products to enter the
American market with duty free access.
It should be stressed that today, unlike the situation a decade ago, most countries
in the LAC region appear to be putting more emphasis on trade agreements with the
North and with large economies in Asia (notwithstanding Venezuela’s recent cam-
paign for a South American agreement excluding the United States). This is due in
part to the expected gains from access to large and more stable economies in the de-
veloped world and Asia, the low expectations about major reductions in agricultural
support in the OECD under the Doha Round, and also to the perceived poor perfor-
mance of sub-regional agreements4.
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4 Of course, Venezuela is currently in a distinct position, incorporating itself into MERCOSUR and
searching for alliances in South America in opposition to the FTAA led by the United Status. There is
here perhaps less than meets the eye. And in any event likely will not much influence agricultural trade.
But it may have some impact on the supply of gas and oil. The present opposition to the FTAAby Argen-
tina and Brazil does have some relation to the reluctance of the United States to discuss agricultural sub-
sidies outside of the WTO.
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bers prone to economic crises in the recent past and large fluctuations in their curren-
cies’exchange rates. MERCOSUR has a«common» external tariff with 800 exceptions,
domestic policies are misaligned with members’ stated common trade objectives, and
countries maintain their individual systems of trade and investment incentives. Alt-
hough MERCOSUR’s objectives go beyond trade in goods (e.g., one aim is infrastruc-
ture integration), after ten years the four core members of the block have reduced their
participation in world trade by a third. In this light of what can reasonably be expected
from a sub-regional agreement, it is worth noting that Central America has already sig-
ned CAFTAand the Andean Group is in negotiations with the United States.
What can one say about this regional emphasis in trade agreements in regard to its
compatibility with the multilateral framework of the WTO. Recently the Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank (IADB, 2002) surveyed the New Regionalism in Latin America
and concluded five points with respect to regionalism and the multilateral system:
1. Although there might be a conflict between preferential trade agreements and
the multilateral system under some circumstances, in the case of LAC the two
approaches appear complementary. The multilateral system treats a«hyper-
market», establishing orderly world trade rules by consensus. Regionalism
treats a neighborhood where possible trade liberalizations beyond those feasi-
ble at the world level can be negotiated, and where extra-commercial policy
considerations can be incorporated.
2. Regional integration is sometimes a worthy second best option, especially gi-
ven the speed of the multilateral system’s ability to advance and to respond to
the asymmetries in countries’ capacity to participate, negotiate and imple-
ment new rules.
3. LAC countries apparently do not view regionalism as a substitute for multila-
teral negotiations, and many LAC countries have been very active in the
Doha Round and past multilateral negotiating rounds.
4. The negotiations that have led to the present new regionalism have served as
a testing and training ground for introducing new rules into the multilateral
system. NAFTA served as such a laboratory for the Uruguay Round. And,
perhaps ironically, the very preferences that might arise from bilateral or re-
gionalist agreements can serve as incentives from third parties to push multi-
lateral negotiations in order to erode these preferences.
5. Finally, while bilateral and regional agreements tend to treat non-systemic
trade issues alone (where direct effects on third parties are not an issue), the
WTO is considered the necessary vehicle for reducing domestic supports and
systemic questions related to third parties that cannot be dealt with at the bila-
teral level. As Jank and de Queiroz Monteiro Jales point out, «Subsidies are
best addressed through multilateral negotiations, such as the WTO negotia-
tions, and by contrast market access is best addressed in a bilateral or regional
framework» (p. 13).
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5 There are four core members and six associates, the latter group is not subject to the common exter-
nal tariff and not limited to trade negotiations within MERCOSUR as a unit. They also do not participate
in the highest decision making bodies of the customs union.
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America and Caribbean today? Is there a trade policy bias
for or against agricultural activities?
In the past, the policies of many developing countries, including a number in the
LAC region, discriminated against their own agriculture. This was typically done by
taxing agriculture directly (for example, controlled food prices and export taxes), but
also and more importantly indirectly through industrial protection and macroecono-
mic policies. These implicit taxes (or indirect effects) on agriculture derived from
overvalued exchange rates and policies protecting industrial sectors, which turned
domestic terms of trade against the farm sector and raised input prices6. In 2004, al-
most certainly the bias is considerably below what it was when measured for the
1970s and 1980s, although, unfortunately, a serious comparative analysis for the last
decade and covering a number of countries has yet to be done to update the estimates
of direct effect (since 1995) and of indirect effects (since 1985)7. During the 1990s,
many of these interventions were indeed eliminated or reduced in scope. According
to a study by the World Bank8, tariffs on industrial products have been lowered more
than those on agricultural products, and exchange rate overvaluation is less prevalent.
Nevertheless, the broad perception remains that many developing countries still re-
tain a policy bias against agriculture. 
One measure of protection is found in the tariff schedules that countries report to
the WTO. Tables 5 and 6 present a summary of regional MFN tariffs corresponding
to the year 2000, and their tariff peaks (tariffs greater than 15%)9. Table 7 shows esti-
mates of regional agricultural tariffs between 2000 and 2002. Contrary to the wides-
pread image of an unprotected, competitive, export-oriented agriculture in Latin
America, one notes from the tariff schedules that MFN tariffs on the imports of agri-
cultural and food products are relatively high for many countries. Across the coun-
tries presented, the average level of tariffs for livestock is 17%, for crops 12%, and
for textiles 18%. Mexico has the highest MFN tariffs for agriculture and food pro-
ducts (categories I, II, and IV), followed by Peru. Chile has the lowest tariffs, and in
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6 See for example the study by Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes (1988).
7 The last mayor comparative study on the direct effects of agricultural was published by the World
Bank for 1985-1995 covering eight countries (see Valdes, 1996). Ideally it is the relative effective rate of
protection between tradable in RNR and tradables in non-RNR activities that would measure policy indu-
ced effects. These are rarely available. See Schiff and Valdes (2002) for a discussion of the various trade
and exchange rate policy-induce effects on RNR incentive. 
8 World Bank,«Reaching the Rural Poor: Strategy and Business Plan,» chapter 4, 2003.
9 Tariff schedule would only represent a part of total protection. Three additional adjustments would
have to be included for a complete picture: tariff preferences, the effects of nontariff barriers (particularly
important in the case of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations), and special surcharges (such as price
bands in Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Chile). MFN rates would understate the true levels of
protection, due both to surcharges and to quantitative restrictions. Estimates of tariff equivalents in the
past for Latin America have shown that MFN rates were considerably below true price wedge between
border and domestic prices (Valdes, 1996). A tariff equivalent is the ad valorem equivalent of tariff and
nontariff barriers as measured by direct price comparisons between border and domestic farm prices ad-
justed for quality differences, transport costs and other costs of marketing. 
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sectors are protected comparably less than livestock. Processed food products also re-
ceive higher protection, demonstrating the widespread phenomenon in industrial and
developing countries of tariff escalation. Of the various sectors, textiles are generally
most protected, and industrial protection is similar to livestock and processed foods,
but higher than crops10.
Tariff averages by broad categories of products reflect the situation of many acti-
vities, some very small, and hide the protection to a few sensitive and generally larger
subsectors. More relevant for understanding protection profiles is to examine tariff
peaks. A tariff peak is defined as a high tariff value exceeding some threshold. In the
context of industrial countries’ tariff profiles, the commodities on which most tariff
peaks apply are generally those of relatively greater importance for developing coun-
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10 A recent World Bank study (Anderson and Valdés, 2006) which included eight countries in Latin
America, concludes that the nominal rates of protection are still negative for agricultural exportables but
of lower absolute value than prior to reforms. The rates on agricultural importables while remaining posi-
tive are also less. The total rate of protection for agricultural tradables has changed very little.
TABLE 5
Average MFN tariff rates by product category, 2000



















Argentina 17.0 10.2 18.5 15.8 21.0 17.2 21.8 1,449
Bolivia 9.4 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 8.7 9.9 1,554
Brazil 16.7 10.6 18.5 15.1 20.6 18.6 21.6 1,417
Chile 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 1,658
Colombia 19.5 12.7 19.0 14.0 18.6 11.0 17.8 1,586
Guatemala 15.5 10.6 12.9 4.8 18.8 4.0 11.4 1,628
Honduras 15.5 11.4 15.4 5.6 17.1 4.9 12.8 1,574
Mexico 27.1 19.7 23.1 13.2 24.8 16.7 24.1 1,750
Peru 24.5 17.2 21.7 12.0 18.0 12.0 12.0 1,462
Paraguay 15.8 10.4 17.8 15.2 20.9 13.1 19.0 1,536
Uruguay 14.7 9.8 17.8 14.1 20.1 15.3 19.9 1,494
Venezuela 19.5 12.8 19.1 13.9 18.8 11.8 18.3 1,586




34 66 64 100 519 658 117 658
Source: Authors’calculations based on WTO.
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From a political economy point of view this is where the«action» is, and in post-Can-
cun WTO discussions the question of tariff peaks is being explicitly addressed. Table
6 presents the proportions of tariff lines in LAC countries, by product category, that
have tariff values exceeding 15%. 
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11 See Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga (2001).
TABLE 6
Proportion of tariffs line by product category that have tariff values exceeding 15%




















Argentina 0.53 0.00 1.00 0.85 0.97 0.69 1.00 0.16
Bolivia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Brazil 0.55 0.00 1.00 0.80 0.94 0.86 1.00 0.81
Chile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Colombia 1.00 0.61 0.95 0.74 0.95 0.37 0.92 0.03
Guatemala 0.71 0.47 0.72 0.15 0.77 0.14 0.54 0.00
Honduras 0.75 0.46 0.74 0.15 0.78 0.15 0.55 0.04
Mexico 0.66 0.65 0.75 0.16 0.94 0.69 0.97 0.34
Peru 0.85 0.44 0.78 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.07
Paraguay 0.61 0.01 0.91 0.81 0.93 0.46 0.85 0.07
Uruguay 0.43 0.00 0.97 0.72 0.91 0.65 0.92 0.14
Venezuela 1.00 0.64 0.94 0.71 0.97 0.45 0.94 0.04
Source: Authors’calculations based on WTO.
Except for Bolivia and Chile, where uniform (and low) tariffs are the rule, one no-
tes that there are surprisingly high proportions of tariff peaks in all product catego-
ries, in many cases, more than 70% of all category lines. The highest proportion of ta-
riff peaks is found in Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia. As in the case of
average tariffs by product category, livestock and food products generally have a gre-
ater number of peaks as a proportion of tariff lines than do crops. Nevertheless, the
proportion of tariff peaks for crops is noticeably high for Colombia, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. Conspicuously, the six MERCOSUR countries
(including associated members) have no tariff peaks for crops, although for forestry,
livestock and processed food the incidence of tariff peaks are very high for this group
of countries (excepting Bolivia and Chile). Although MERCOSUR has uniformly
low protection for crops, in the other half of the countries, crops are protected by ta-
riffs that exceed 15% in 45% or more of tariff lines in that category.
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policies against agriculture, there appears to be a bias in favor of at least livestock
and processed foods across most countries. And in the case of crops, the evidence
is heterogeneous, depending on the particular country. What is clear is that there is
scope for tariff reductions that might counteract the negative effects on consumers
of world price increases due to global trade liberalization. Given that there is room
for tariff reductions on importables –and in the context of ongoing negotiations
that will put further pressure on lower trade barriers– one can anticipate a strong
political interest in possible compensation programs to cushion the transition of
those producers and consumers who are adversely affected by a freer trade regime.
(Below we discuss possible types of compensation schemes that might provide
such a cushion.)
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TABLE 7
Average Agricultural Tariffs in LAC: 2000-2002
Simple average Coefficient of variation Weighted average
South America
Argentina 12.1 41.3 13.7
Bolivia 10.0 8.0 9.9
Brazil 12.2 42.6 11.5
Chile 7.9 3.8 8.0
Colombia 14.8 35.1 14.6
Ecuador 14.6 36.3 14.3
Paraguay 11.6 39.7 16.2
Peru 17.2 38.4 16.5
Uruguay 12.3 39.8 13.9
Venezuela 14.8 35.1 16.2
Central America and Mexico
Costa Rica 11.8 120.3 10.8
Guatemala 9.9 74.7 10.9
Honduras 10.2 72.5 10.6
Mexico 20.9 123.4 28.2
Nicaragua 8.1 87.7 11.1
Panama 12.8 103.1 11.7
El Salvador 10.8 83.3 12.5
Caribbean
Cuba 9.8 77.6 10
Dominican Republic 15.7 61.1 12.5
Jamaica 15.5 109.0 16.4
Trinidad & Tobago 14.5 109.7 13.9
Source: FAO, 2005.
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trade policy
A. Negotiating positions: Geneva, before and after Cancun, Mar
del Plata and Hong Kong
The trend toward bilateral agreements, especially with the US, EU and large
Asian economies has been discussed above. Latin American countries have mainly
followed the guidelines established by the WTO. Five years ago, Valdés (2000) noted
that one could distinguish between three negotiating sub-groups in the LAC region.
The South America block was represented in the Cairns Group. Caribbean countries
held an opposing position favoring a slower pace of trade liberalization. Central
America and Mexico held an intermediate position, although closer to the Cairns
Group. These three positions reflected to some extent the net trade situation of indivi-
dual countries, which has been discussed above in section I.B. The net-importers ten-
ded to favor the slower approach, the major exporters in the southern cone of South
American tended to adopt the fast-track approach. The most sensitive political issue
surrounding trade policy was, and continues to be, the question of import-competing
agricultural sub sectors. And the concern over import-competing sub sectors is still
reflected in the tariff structure in LAC, which was seen in section II.B.
Today, the negotiating coalitions are more numerous. There does not exist a sim-
ple set of negotiating positions by which one can characterize LAC countries. Across
the world there are now several coalitions, referred to as G-10 (net food importers),
G-20 (seeking improved developed country market access), G-33 (another group of
developing countries concerned about special concessions), and the FIP (five interes-
ted parties – Australia, Brazil, the EU, India and the US). We are not in a position to
assess whether or not these present coalitions would increase the probability of the
completion of a successful Doha Round, especially with respect to individual LAC
country interests.
Cancun 2003 was the fifth summit meeting supported by the World Trade Organi-
zation, which offered an opportunity to renew the initial proposals established within
the Doha Round.  The proposed agenda emphasized non-agricultural market access
and, more significantly, the liberalization of agriculture. With regards to the latter,
discussions –which did not reach an a consensus– centered on market access, prima-
rily the elimination or reduction of tariffs, but also the reduction of domestic supports
and subsidies of various kinds, and the reduction of export enhancements, including
subsidies and credits for exports. Issues regarding special and differential treatments
and also special safeguard mechanisms were part of the items to be discussed. Deve-
loping countries strengthened their demands by creating blocks, such as the G20 and
G33 on agriculture and also the G90, representing the developing world12. The Can-
cun Ministerial conference ended in disappointment and agriculture remained as one
of the unsettled issues. 
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dress appropriate formulas to reduce import barriers and export subsidies. Discus-
sions centered on state trading, special agricultural safeguards and, subsidies. Nevert-
heless, an official schedule for abolition of all forms of agricultural subsidies still was
not established.  
Within the last years, several attempts have been made to promote the agenda on
trade liberalization in the Americas. In early November of 2005 the summit of the
Americas took place in Mar del Plata, Argentina, with the general theme of«creating
jobs to fight poverty and strengthen democratic governance.» The participating coun-
tries, however, made explicit the relevance of trade negotiations, and stressed their
concerns regarding market access, agricultural subsidies and trade-distorting domes-
tic practices of their trading partners (which in this context means essentially the Uni-
ted States). Although the summit did not represent an official attempt at a trade agre-
ement, it revealed a strong polarization and the discontent of the largest nations in
South America: Argentina and Brazil13. The position of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay
(and their new ally, Venezuela) was to decline negotiations on FTAA with the United
States without including discussions on US agricultural subsidy reductions. Brazil is
also reluctant to radically liberalize services and manufacturing. On the other side
were Mexico, the CAFTA countries, Chile, and other countries in negotiations with
the US (Peru, Colombia and Ecuador), all of which pursue deepening their commer-
cial relations with the US through bilateral FTAs 
Negotiations took place in the Sixth Ministerial Conference in Honk Kong, to
continue with the Doha Development Agenda, which deadlines at the end of 2006.
Once again, the most critical issue is the definition of a scale of reductions in indus-
trial tariffs and farm subsidies. The final Hong Kong draft promised the reduction of
agricultural tariffs by the year 2013 from countries in the European Union, as well as
reductions in the levels of direct subsidies in OECD, although this latter is still to be
determined in a last set of negotiations in 2006. This most recent Ministerial Confe-
rence was not an obvious success, but at least some form of consensus is taking sha-
ped, and it did not end in failure as some previous Doha round meetings.
Turning from the external environment to internal politics, recently, some coun-
tries in LAC have taken what might be termed an anti-globalization turn. Venezuela
has left the Andean Group, accepting to join MERCOSUR, the government saying in
part because Andean group countries were negotiating FTAs with the United States.
(Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia are at least gesturing toward a Bolivarian association
of LAC states.) Internal politics has also complicated trade negotiations for Ecuador.
Despite Peru’s previous apparent willingness to come to an agreement with the Uni-
ted States, the recent presidential election raised doubts. One of the final candidates
was strongly opposed to the FTA, and the winning candidate was in favor of the agre-
ement but has indicated a desire to reexamine the terms. In broad terms, the current
situation in the region is one of much bilateral FTAactivity and ongoing negotiations,
Mercosur despite its shortcomings continues (with a strong political impulse), and
the larger scheme of a hemispheric agreement lies dormant.
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Once trade agreements, such with the US, are signed (and with the EU), the scope
for direct trade interventions is far more limited, which emphasizes trade aspects be-
yond border measures. There is less flexibility –perhaps none– for quantitative res-
trictions, and there are bilateral commitments for tariff reductions. The new agenda
that appears emerging for agricultural trade includes (a) the management of preferen-
tial quotas for exports (very important for Central America today in CAFTA), (b) the
situation of agro-process products in terms of tariff escalation (section II.A.), and (c)
the proliferation and tightening of agro-food standards.
With respect to the latter item on the new agenda, the increase in perishable ex-
ports –fresh fruits, vegetables and meats– and processed foods has increased the im-
portance of compliance with the both developed country sanitary and phyto-sanitary
(SPS) rules and with the demands of private sector importers and retailers in OECD
countries (which are often more stringent than official standards). This move toward
new and processed products is generally overlooked in modeling efforts and further
highlights the heterogeneity of LAC countries’ agricultural sectors. In this context,
there is little hope that health agencies and private sector actors will grant developing
countries will«special and differential treatment» or that there will be a slowing of
the trend toward higher standards. The strengths and the weaknesses of the links in
the agro-food supply chains in LAC become more prominent as countries become
more export oriented in non-commodity products. There are high costs of compliance
with tighter standards, which will burden poorer countries and those with weaker ins-
titutional capability for SPS and other agro-food standards. Signaling credibility to
importers is now more a question of international and third-party accreditation,
which adds significant fixed costs to doing business. One bad apple can ruin millions
of dollars worth of lost export opportunities. Complicating this issue is the highly
complex challenge of maintaining credible government certification and regulatory
agencies for tracing SPS, disease and pest controls for animal products and the trace-
ability for meats, and rules of origin. Especially worrisome is maintaining credibility
in the face of risk of corruption whether the stakes are so high and public institutions
maybe weak.  
Developed world standards regarding good agricultural practices –hygiene, waste
management, safe water, records and traceability– are becoming part of the trade
agenda for many LAC products. Of course, this is less the case of commodities such
as wheat, soybeans and corn. But in the products for which the trend toward stronger
standard compliance is relevant, the requirements are influenced to large extent by
buyer demands in OECD countries, and compliance is relatively easier for commer-
cial farmers and less so for smaller producers.
Turning to the issue of genetically modified crops (GMOs), in addition to finan-
cial and legal issues (such as intellectual property right enforcement), the internatio-
nal debate regarding potential health hazards of GM is also relevant when conside-
ring market access and biotechnology policies for some LAC exporters. This has
been prominent in the case of soybeans. According to a recent assessment by the
FAO, there is a consensus among scientists that biotech products currently on the
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tional safety procedures. But an extensive global survey by Environics International
found that nearly 50% of respondents in some European countries felt that the poten-
tial benefits of GM crops do not outweigh the risks of the technology14. Furthermore,
there is no consensus regarding the environmental dangers posed by GM crops (FAO
2004). The outcomes of the current debates regarding GM crop safety among scien-
tists and policymakers will have a large impact on the future policy priorities and ex-
port potential. These issues go well beyond agricultural trade negotiations, and are
the subject of a range of negotiating areas, although they will be highly important for
LAC exports of primary and processed agricultural products. 
C. The trend toward compensation and social safety nets15
Both direct income supports and conditional cash transfer are recognized as a
form of compensation to farmers and other groups for their losses due to ending or
reducing border protection and production subsidies with associated with trade agre-
ements and other reforms.. Replacing dubious rural poverty alleviation schemes fo-
cused on agricultural protection, direct payments can be targeted to the poor as well
as to the farmer of whatever income level. For farmers specifically, such income sup-
ports can ease the transition to a more efficient agricultural sector. Decoupled income
support programs (DIS programs) and Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs
have already been used successfully in OECD and LAC countries to compensate far-
mers for the reduction in protection, to smooth consumption during economic down-
turns, and to alleviate poverty directly in rural areas16.
Decoupled payments: direct income supports for farmers
Permissible supports should be funded directly by the taxpayers (not indirectly by
consumers), and they should leave producer prices unsupported17. In principle, such
direct income supports could serve as compensation to ease the political resistance to
reducing trade distortions. In the 1990s, OECD countries, particularly the EU and the
US introduced decoupled payments explicitly to protect producers from the reduction
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14 The State of Food and Agriculture 2003-2004: Agricultural Biotechnology: Meeting the needs of
the poor? Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Chapter 6.
15 Much of this section has been drawn from T. Castañeda (2004).
16 Of course, the adoption of income supports as compensation for once-protected farmers might
even be unnecessary, if the reduction in protection is gradual, taking place over a large number of years
(say, 10 to 20 years, as has been in the case of some products under bilateral and regional agreements in
LAC). And it is possible that the introduction of these support programs might be unwise in any case, if
the institutional capacity of a government is too weak and open to corruption to implement such pro-
grams. Prior to adopting any income support program, considerable attention ought to be paid to identif-
ying the circumstances where those policies would in fact act to alleviate the poverty of rural household
or to compensate farmers for real harm due to the reduction in price protection, and where successful im-
plementation would be in fact possible. Moreover, although compensation should be temporary, expe-
rience has shown that transfer policies are usually difficult to terminate.
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direct income supports, although decoupled payments still are less than half of total
support (30 to 40%). DIS programs have been used in Mexico (when joining NAFTA
in 1994), and in Turkey in 2001 as compensation for price support and input subsidy
elimination, and tariff reductions.
OECD and developing countries’programs have similar broad designs and imple-
mentation, but significant differences in payment basis, record keeping, and monito-
ring18. Furthermore, OECD countries have had a long history of domestic support
programs, in addition to tariff and nontariff protection19.
Poverty-focused payments: conditional cash transfers
Conditional cash transfers (CCT) in LAC have shown success as rural poverty sa-
fety-net programs, sometimes offering significant cash support to poor families. As a
condition for payments, families send their children to school and for regular health
check-ups and vaccinations (for children under five years of age)20. Apparently a key
to the success of these programs is a simultaneous investment in social infrastructure
(better schools and health services). 
CCT programs provide income-based rather than farm-related support for rural
families, but they may be also programs for compensating rural farmers and landless
workers for loss of employment or income due to lower sectoral protection. CCT pro-
grams can be properly targeted to areas either producing certain import-competing
crops that are more affected by tariff reductions, or where landless workers are more
prevalent and there are few alternatives to work outside farming21. By 2002 CCT pro-
grams in Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Honduras aided more than 10.5
million poor families, mostly rural. Fiscal costs totaled US$3.2 billion (about 0.2% of
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17 For example, by the use of fixed yields and land area as basis of payment.
18 Information availability and payment details vary widely across countries. For a discussion of the
criteria for payments under decoupled schemes, see Baffes and de Gorter (2003). 
19 Decoupled programs that provide transfers to farmers do not have as a primary objective the alle-
viation of poverty in rural areas. In OECD countries farmers are not the poor and are often better off than
urban residents. Although in developing countries, many of the poor have benefited from decoupled pay-
ment programs, the lion’s share of program expenditures have gone to large farmers. Payments are based
on past production levels and areas planted, favoring large commercial farmers producing for the market.
Most decoupled programs have ignored landless workers who may also suffer from the reductions in
agricultural production and in employment opportunity that result from the elimination of domestic price
supports.
20 The rationale is that poor rural families often do not have the resources to pay for the direct costs of
school or going to health centers, and have high opportunity costs of sending children to school.
21 CCT programs have been recently introduced in a number of LAC countries including Brazil, Co-
lombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Jamaica, and in other countries such as Turkey. Most programs share a si-
milar design, drawing on cross-country experiences and evaluations. They have three common features:
(1) Implementation is focused on poor rural areas, producing basic foods for consumption or for the mar-
ket in small plots. (2) Payments are based on the number of children in a household, which provides lar-
ger subsidies to poorer, typically larger families and establishes a basis of exit from the program as chil-
dren grow older and lose eligibility. And (3) they have the goal that any continuation of the program
should be contingent on its impact on the economic and human capital development of the poor.
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(PROGRESAin 1997) after a major, region-wide crisis. 
5. Conflicts of interest: the diversity across Latin America in
trade composition implies diverse negotiation priorities
A. The heterogeneity of the effects of trade agreements on
welfare in Latin America
Beyond the effect on world prices, much of the discussion of the potential benefits
of trade reform centers on the impact of liberalization on increases in the value of ex-
ports. Most simulations of global trade liberalization project large increases in ex-
ports from Latin America. Similarly, the elimination of all tariffs (including tariff
equivalents) in the Western Hemisphere due to the FTAA is estimated to lead to an
increase in the exports of Latin American agricultural products by 14%22. The outco-
mes of such tariff reductions would differ of course, by product and country. The IDB
estimates that exports would rise by over 10% for all subgroups of countries in he-
misphere, except Mexico and Canada. Exports from the Andean group rise about
12%, exports from Argentina and the Central American and Caribbean group rise by
15%, and from Brazil and Chile about 27%. 
From a body of studies on global liberalization one can make three broad genera-
lizations pertinent to the LAC region: (1) that agricultural prices will increase due to
multilateral trade agreements by 10% or less, which is relatively small compared to
the inherent volatility of world prices; (2) that exports will increase significantly; and
(3) in absolute dollar terms the global welfare gains are large and captured primary
by trade liberalizing countries. But the results for welfare gains, while positive in the
aggregate, are typically small for individual countries relative to national GDP, espe-
cially for large economies. For example, welfare gains are estimated to be between
zero and 1.2% of GDPfor countries like Argentina and Brazil, which are examples of
countries that would be expected to benefit the most from global trade liberalization
(Bianchi, Rozada and Sanguinetti, 2004).
In addition, within each country, it is more difficult to say what would be the di-
rection of the impact of more open agricultural trade for low-income, net-food-bu-
ying consumers in the region, living in both urban and rural areas. In terms of low-in-
come households, the presumption is, as for example tentatively concluded by
Anderson (2004), that a more liberal world trade regime would have the effects in de-
veloping countries of directly alleviating poverty by boosting the demand for unski-
lled labor and the exports of poor countries. Nevertheless, there is a concern that the
recent trend toward trade liberalization in Latin America might have negative effects
on the demand for unskilled labor, which would be translated into lower wages,
unemployment, and poverty. 
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links between trade and labor outcomes in LAC rural areas by estimating cross hou-
sehold regression models with micro-data from 60 LAC household surveys and
country aggregate data23. The study finds a significant association between individual
labor outcomes and some measures of trade, in particular exports, trade as a share of
GDP, and the price of exports. The main result is that international trade has been as-
sociated with higher wages and labor income in rural areas. The benefits of trade in
terms of labor income do not differ by groups of formal education. Instead, those
workers located in the bottom quantiles of the conditional wage distribution appear to
benefit more from increased trade openness. Higher export prices are also associated
with higher wages, employment, and labor income; all individuals in rural areas be-
nefit about the same due to higher export prices24. This study support the view that a
higher exposure to trade may bring about an expansion of the agricultural sector and
benefits to those factors intensively utilized in rural areas, including labor, consistent
with comparative advantages25. Under this interpretation, the results are consistent
with models of trade and convergence, whereby economic activity relocate from
large urban centers to smaller cities.
B. The heterogeneity of the effects of future reforms
Given their differing trade structure, one expects a variation across LAC countries
of the impacts of global agricultural trade reform. Multilateral liberalization will
most likely harm – in the short term – large groups of people in the 17 net food im-
porting countries. This is not to deny that from a longer-term perspective trade libera-
lization across all economic sectors would expand growth, and ultimately serve to
raise incomes and reduce poverty. Several studies have shown that more openness to
all trade is correlated with faster national growth, but in the short and medium term
there will be some losers. One way of anticipating the possible net effect of agricultu-
ral trade liberalization is to assess the net trade positions of LAC countries in relation
to the various degrees of protection of farm products in the OECD. 
A recent World Bank study (de Ferranti et al., 2005) presents net trade balances
by individual countries according to subsets of products receiving three distinct le-
vels of protection and support (available data 1999-200126) in the OECD using ave-
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23 The study merges data for more than 4 million individuals surveyed in 17 Latin American and Ca-
ribbean (LAC) countries between 1989 and 2002 with measures and indicators of international trade,
mostly drawn from the SIMAdatabase at the World Bank.
24 Interestingly, the results for urban areas are rarely statistically significant: total labor income in ur-
ban areas is not affected by trade as measured either by volumes or prices. Urban hourly wages do not
seem to be affected by measures of trade, and employment appears to increase with trade (although this
effect is sometimes only marginally significant).
25 It should be noted that the LAC household surveys are not designed to capture the agricultural sec-
tor specifically, and that areas identified as rural may be small semi-urban centers connected to the rural
economy, including agriculture. 
26 OECD (2002b),«Agricultural policies in OECD countries: Monitoring and evaluation 2002, High-
lights.»
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concentrated in a subset of products (for example, the coverage of the CAP in the
EU), and so the higher is the level of protection and support (defined by the Nominal
Protection Coefficient, NPC, and the Producer Subsidy Equivalent, PSE), the lower
is the number of products covered (and included in calculating the net trade balances
in Table 2). 
For example, in the case of Argentina, only $125.5 million of its average annual
agricultural exports for 2000-2002 were in the subset of agricultural goods that were
very highly protected in the OECD (Group 1: NPCs > 1.85 and PSEs > 50%), na-
mely, sugar and rice. These exports represented only slightly more than 1% of its to-
tal agricultural exports. Argentina imported annually on average US$3.6 million of
those very highly protected products, giving a net trade balance ratio of exports to
imports for this subset of agricultural goods of 34.5. Expanding the subset to include
dairy and other products at the second level of support (Group 2: NPCs > 1.20,
PSEs > 40%), Argentina’s exports increased to $429 million, but proportionally less
than the increase in imports to $27.3 million (exports to imports, X/M = 15.7). By ex-
panding the subset of products still further to include those that were at least modera-
tely protected by the OECD (Group 3: NPC > 1.15, PSEs > 28%), Argentina’s ex-
ports rose dramatically to $4,337.3 million. Its imports increased to $112.1 million,
giving it a net export trade balance of 38.7 for products that were at least moderately
protected. It is worth noting that Argentina’s total agricultural exports averaged $10.9
billion during 2000-2002, which implies that the country’s exports were heavily
oriented toward products with relatively lower levels of protection in the OCED. 
What emerges from these indicators is that by far most LAC countries (15 of 22
studied) were net importers of products that are more highly protected in the OECD.»
Moreover, these moderate-to-highly protected products represented a significant
share of total imports of agricultural goods, averaging 36% for the region. The nota-
ble net-exporters of these products are Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay and to a
lesser extent Brazil, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Cuba. Due to the importance of sugar
for several Central American and Caribbean countries, it is in the category of pro-
ducts with the highest levels of protection that one finds that most countries were net
exporters: 16 of the 22 countries. Considering both the level and composition of ex-
ports, some countries could potentially capture relatively greater returns to the reduc-
tion of the highest levels of OECD protection (sugar and rice), especially in the Ca-
ribbean and in Guatemala. 
Looking at the absolute levels and their share in total exports, Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Nicaragua are clear cases where the largest gains would arise in reduc-
tion of protection for products that are moderately protected in the OECD. Neverthe-
less, approximately 60% of their agricultural exports face even lower levels of pro-
tection by OECD countries (that is, either NPC < 1.15 or PSEs < 28%). By
contrast, for Cuba the bulk of benefits would come from the most highly protected
group of products (namely, sugar), which accounts for nearly 60% of its exports of
agricultural products.
Some countries that are notable net exporters of agricultural products are also net
importers of products that receive moderate to very high protection in the OECD. For
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all agricultural products for the period 2000-2002. For the subset of products«at least
moderately protected» in the OECD, Colombia and Chile were net importers, only
exporting $269 and $125 million annually, representing 9% and 4% of their total
agriculture-related exports. By contrast, these moderate-to-highly protected products
represent approximately 40% of both countries’total agriculture-related imports. For
these two countries, a reduction in protection (and an increase in world price) of pro-
ducts with lower levels of OECD support would have greater impact in expanding
exports than the reduction in supports for moderate to high protection.
One implication of the percentages of trade by protection category is that redu-
cing the highest protection levels would be perceived to be of obvious benefit to a
number of countries in the region from the point of view of their current agricultural
trade patterns: Brazil (12%), Uruguay (16%), Guatemala (15%), and Cuba (59%).
Considering a wider group of protected products (product Groups 1 to 3), the majo-
rity of LAC countries are net food importers, whose exports are oriented to products
with relatively lower protection rates. In the long run, without such protection in the
OECD, LAC countries would increase their exports in some of these moderate-to-
highly protected products, and perhaps some countries which are now net importers
would become net exporters. But in the near term, tariff and subsidy reductions for
products with moderate levels of protection (which would lead to higher world prices
of those products) would be felt negatively by most (15 of 22) LAC countries, which
are net importers of those goods. Astrategic question for a country’s trade negotiation
position is how to assess the possibilities for trade reversals, which is task primarily
for the private sector.
From the perspective of present trade balance patterns, most of LAC countries
would recognize greater export-related benefits from a broad reduction in OECD
protection on products with relatively low OECD support that affect the bulk of their
agricultural exports. But one should keep in mind that protection as defined here con-
siders both tariffs and subsidies in terms of NPRs and PSEs. There are, however, li-
kely some products for which tariffs are relatively high but other government support
is low or zero, such as in the case of tariff escalation for semi-processed and proces-
sed agricultural goods. These products are typically dealt with by governments be-
yond the scope of agricultural policy, and are perhaps outside of the focus of trade ne-
gotiations on«agriculture.» For this reason, simply because a country’s exports are
oriented to products with relatively low OECD«protection» does not mean that it
would not benefit from a reduction in high tariffs, although negotiations over such a
reduction would be done in a non-agriculture forum. 
C. What is more important for agricultural trade, tariffs or
subsidies in rich countries?
Arecent study using a gravity model of bilateral trade in agricultural products bet-
ween the United States and LAC countries (Bianchi, Rozada, and Sanguinetti, 2004)
found that the point estimate of the elasticity of US imports with respect to a tariff re-
duction is six times that of the elasticity with respect to the tariff-equivalent of«subsi-
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price attributable to non-tariff border measures and subsidies. This is consistent with
other studies (e.g, Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga, 2002 and Tokarick, 2003, using a
global modeling approach) that emphasize the importance of tariffs versus subsidies
in determining import demand of agricultural goods. Adecline in subsidies would re-
duce the incentives for US production (the reduction depending on the degree of de-
coupling of subsidies), but without a change in tariffs consumers would face the same
price. Imports perhaps would increase as domestic production fell, but the total quan-
tity bought by consumers would remain constant. Adecline in tariffs, however, would
increase the total quantity demanded. The empirical evidence shows the significance
of the displacement effect on agricultural imports from non-tariff supports maintai-
ning domestic producer prices above world prices, but the negative effect of higher
tariffs on import demand is much greater27.
This has implications for countries in the LAC region for both WTO and FTAs
with the United States and Europe. In terms of market access, LAC countries would
have greater returns to negotiating the reduction of tariffs and the expansion of im-
port quotas relative to what certainly would be difficult and lengthy negotiations over
total subsidy reduction. The current attention of LAC countries might be misdirected
toward the appalling level of total expenditures of rich countries on their agricultural
sectors. The evidence shows that focusing on the reduction of border protections (ta-
riffs and quotas) in rich countries would yield significant gains in trade volume. Of
course, for many countries, rich and not-so-rich, a tariff is a means of maintaining
producer income that does not require government payments, yields revenues, and
passes the costs of protection to consumers. Reducing tariffs may be all the more dif-
ficult if, in political terms, it would require an increase in government’s outlays ai-
med at farmers in the context of a cap on fiscal expenditures.
6. Conclusions
In the Latin America of 2006 the new force in agricultural trade policy is found in
bilateral agreements, many north-south. Unilateral reforms have been implemented
to various degrees, some leading to very open agricultural markets (e.g., Argentina,
Brazil, Chile) and others still leaving protected markets (e.g., Colombia, Ecuador).
Sub-regional agreements have established blocks of countries, and future action to-
ward integration will be via associations between blocks (e.g., the Andean Group and
MERCOSUR). The ongoing WTO negotiations will continue, but at the moment ap-
pear unpromising with regard to substantial agricultural trade liberalization. 
In the Latin American region, the share of agriculture in total national exports is
high, especially when considering the sector’s low participation in national GDP. And
when analyzing agricultural trade, one should include not only primary agriculture
42 Alberto Valdés y William Foster
27 The analysis for«bilateral» trade between the EU as a single entity and other countries is much less
clear as to the relative effects on import demand of tariffs versus subsidies. The weaker results might be
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non-farm rural income. Evidence from several countries in the region shows that the
share in total rural household income of non-farm employment is large and growing.
Being a land abundant region, with relatively low population densities, and where the
growth of agriculture is constrained by domestic demand, the growth of the agro-
food sector in LAC is highly dependent on exports. 
Growth in primary agriculture and growth in the agro-industrial sector (dependent
on the health of the primary sector) have been and likely will continue to be for most
countries in the region engines to national and rural economic development. There is
evidence also suggests that the agro-food sector’s growth contribute to the alleviation
of poverty, certainly rural poverty and even national poverty in some countries. 
Although it is difficult to make broad characterizations about the region, given
both the diversity of trade patterns and the diversity of the impacts of future WTO re-
sults on individual countries, it is worth highlighting three findings directly relevant
for the WTO negotiating positions. First, border protection versus domestic subsi-
dies: LAC countries would have greater returns to negotiating the reduction of tariffs
and the expansion of import quotas compared to the reduction in total OECD domes-
tic subsidies. Second, most LAC countries would recognize greater export-related
benefits from a broad reduction in OECD protection on products with relatively low
OECD support compared to focusing on higher protected products. Third, although
the region is, taken as one unit, very agro-export oriented, there are 16 (of 22) coun-
tries that are net-food importers and 10 (of 22) are net agro-forestry product impor-
ters.
This last finding complicates the question of trade negotiations by introducing the
issue of the distribution of the benefits of freer trade, and complicates the formation
of effective coalitions. Net food importers benefit from the lower world prices indu-
ced by protectionism and subsidies on agriculture in OECD countries. Moreover, for
many LAC countries the domestic policy debate is centered on the concerns of the
import-competing sub-sectors. And in fact, contrary to the image of unprotected,
competitive, export-oriented agricultural policies in LAC, the observed MFN tariff
profiles on imports of agricultural and food products are relatively high. 
Countries in the region implemented economy-wide and trade reforms before the
Uruguay Round. Such reforms, entirely consistent with later WTO agreements, were
initially unilateral and later incorporated into bilateral and sub-regional trade agree-
ments. Without a base of unilateral reforms, particularly on trade, it is unlikely that
bilateral and sub-regional agreements would have been effective in terms of develo-
ping the new regionalism observed since the 1990s. With early reforms, agro-food
exports and imports expanded significantly, although exports of all agricultural pro-
ducts grew faster. 
Recently there has been a trend toward bilateral agreements, with several bilate-
rals and sub-regionals having been signed by LAC countries during the last few ye-
ars. Today, unlike the situation a decade ago, most LAC countries emphasize agree-
ments with the North and with large economies in Asia, due in part to the expected
gains from access to these countries, the low expectations about major reductions in
OECD support under the Doha Round, and to the perceived poor performance of sub-
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their resistance to the FTAA and the difficulties with negotiations with the EU, still
have much to gain from strong participation in the current WTO round. While nego-
tiations are still being held within the WTO framework, the subsidies from OECD
countries continue.  At least, the Hong Kong summit confirmed the year 2013 as a
deadline for the European Union to decrease its agricultural tariffs. 
With respect to the proliferation and tightening of agro-food standards, the incre-
ase in perishable exports and processed foods has increased the importance of com-
pliance with the both developed country sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) rules and
with the demands of private sector importers and retailers in OECD countries. Health
agencies and private sector actors in the developed world will grant no«special and
differential treatment,» the trend toward higher standards will continue. The strengths
and the weaknesses of the links in the agro-food supply chains in LAC become more
prominent as countries become more export oriented in non-commodity products.
There are high costs of compliance with tighter standards, and will burden poorer
countries, and those with weaker institutional capability for implementation of stan-
dards. Standards in the developed world regarding good agricultural practices are be-
coming part of the trade agenda for many LAC products. This has been less the case
for commodities, where the GMO issue has been the main non-trade-policy concern.
With respect to GMOs, the dilemma for LAC comes from the tension between the
productivity enhancement potential and the demand for GMO-free products in some
countries. 
The increasing importance of the agro-processing industry in expanding exports
also highlights the need to confront the tariff escalation issue, both in the general con-
text of the WTO, and in FTAs with the US and other developed countries. We should
emphasize that there is a move toward new and processed products. This trend is ge-
nerally overlooked in modeling efforts and one would hope that the FAO and organi-
zation would expand its attention to the diversity of agricultural sectors in the LAC.
For example, in the Chile-US agreement reductions in tariffs on processed and stora-
geable commodities were left behind, with an 8 to 12 year period before tariff reduc-
tions, and these products remain vulnerable to the application by the US of special sa-
feguards. The fast growth in processed product exports from the LAC, despite high
tariff escalation on the part of developed importers suggests that exports of this sector
could expand even faster with further WTO reforms. 
This is more of a WTO legal question, but one more thing that could be of special
importance to LAC, and that might influence the impacts of the Doha Round, is the
issue of WTO challenges to the price depressing effects of subsidies. Following to the
WTO ruling against US cotton subsidies (that exceeded the committed cap on amber
box distorting measures), the door is open for legal action against other commodity
subsidies. As a recent Financial Times article notes,«the same rules apply to all agri-
cultural products» (Beattie, November 30, 2005). Potential cases against the United
States could involve maize, rice, sorghum, and potatoes. (Even now, Uruguay is con-
templating action on rice.) And the EU might not be immune in the cases of toma-
toes, canned vegetables (tomatoes and peas), citrus fruit juices, tobacco, butter, skim-
med milk, and wine and spirits. Further, some LAC exports such as wine, fruit and
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form, and some subsidies (such as those attached to the requirement that processors
use European-grown farm produce) may be targets for WTO legal actions. The rami-
fications of the cotton case could be, even under existing rules, significant for a wide
variety of LAC countries, not simply the large commodity producers usually conside-
red the big winners of OECD trade and subsidy reforms.
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